Committeee of Consumer Services; Parowan Valley Pumpers association,  Cedar Valley Pumpers association and Beryl Pumpers association; Enterprise Valley Pumpers , Inc. v. Public  Service Commission of Utah; Milly 0. Bernard, Chairman; Kenneth Rigtrup, Commissioner; and Pavid R. Irvine, Commissioner : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Committeee of Consumer Services; Parowan
Valley Pumpers association, Cedar Valley Pumpers
association and Beryl Pumpers association;
Enterprise Valley Pumpers , Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of Utah; Milly 0. Bernard, Chairman;
Kenneth Rigtrup, Commissioner; and Pavid R.
Irvine, Commissioner : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Grant Macfarlane, Jr., Patrick Shea; Attorneys for CP National Corporation
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Comm. Consumer Svcs v. Utah Public Svc Comm'n, No. 16891 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2160
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES; 
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIA-
TION, CEDAR VALLEY Pill1PERS 
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS 
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY 
PUMPERS, INC., 
Appellants, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD, Chair-
man; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Commis-
sioner; and DAVID R. IRVINE, 
Commissioner, and CP NATIONAL 
CORPORATION, 
Respondents. 
CASE NO. 16891 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
C. P. NATIONAL CORPORATION 
An Appeal of the Supplemental Report 
and Order of January 11, 1980 of the 
Public Service Commission. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Grant Macfarlane, Jr. 
Patrick Shea 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for CP National 
· Corporation 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
POINT II: 
POINT III: 
POINT IV: 
POINT V: 
CONCLUSION . 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS 
DETERMINED THAT THE RATES IN EFFECT DURING 
THE TIME PERIOD IN DISPUTE WERE JUST AND 
REASONABLE RATES. THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE AND IT IS NOT THE PREROGATIVE 
OF THE COURT TO OR..")ER A CUSTOMER REFUUD. 
WHEN A COMMISSION ORDER IS REVERSED AND 
REMANDED BY THE SUPREME COURT THE 
COMMISSION MAY ADD TO, MODIFY OR COMPLETE 
THE FINDINGS AND/OR ORDER . 
WHEN A RATE IS FIXED BY THE COMMISSION 
AND HAS NOT BEEN SUSPENDED DURING THE 
PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL NO REFUND CAN BE 
OBTAINED FROM THE UTILITY COMPANY . 
SECTION 54-7-17 UCA 1953 DOES NOT REQUIRE 
OR PERMIT A REFUND IN THIS CASE . 
A REFUND ORDER WOULD BE CLEARLY AGAINST 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE HEARD BY THE 
COMMISSION. EVEN IF THE COMMISSION WAS 
WITHOUT POWER TO MODIFY ITS FINDINGS IT 
HAS THE POWER IN A PASS THRU CASE TO 
PLACE A RATE INTO EFFECT FOR A PRIOR 
PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF 
UTILITY EXPENSES 
1 
2 
2 
2 
8 
10 
13 
17 
22 
28 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Barnes v. Kesler & Sons. Const. Co. 549 P.2d 411 ... 
California Manufacturers Association vs. Public Utilit 
Connnission, Southern Cali ornia Gas Com an and 
San Diego Gas an Electric Company, Ca i ornia (1979) 
595 P. 2d 98, 100, 103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
City of Los Angeles vs. the Public Service Commission 
(Caiifornia 497 P.Zd 786) ........... . 
City of Los AnHeles et al, vs. Public Utility Commission 
et al., 1 2 Cal. Rptr. 313, 497 P.2d 785 ..... 
City of Los Angeles vs. Public Utility Commission et al, 
(California) 497 P. Zd 785 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972) . 
Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P.781 
Dunn vs. Wallingford, 47 Utah 491, 155 P.347 .. 
Foshee vs. General Telephone Co. of the Southeast 
(Alabama), 322. So.2d 715, 717 .... 
Greenhalgh vs. United Tintic Mines Company 42 Utah 524, 
132 p. 390 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hargrave vs. Leigh, 73 Utah 178, 272 P.289 ... 
Keco Industries, Inc. vs. The Cincinnati & Suburban Bell 
Tel. Co. (Ohio), 141 N.E.Zd 465, 468-469 .... 
Mandel Brothers, Inc. vs. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co. 
(Illinois), 117 N.E.2d 774, 775 ........ . 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph vs. Public 
Service Commission, 107 Utah 520, 155 P.2d 184 ... 
The Mountain States Tele 
ervice Commission 
__ Pages 
12 
25' 26 
21 
20' 21 
23' 24, 
21 
11 
11 
11 
15, 16 
12 
11 
14, lJ'. 
15 
20 
20' 21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. vs. Public 
Utility Commission, supra ........... . 
Openshaw v. Young, 107 Utah 399, 152 P.2d 84 (1944) 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Public Util. Comm. supra, 
62 Cal.Zd 634, 649-656, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1,401 P.2d 353. 
Parowan Pum ers Association v. Public Service Commission 
p. 7' . . . . . . . ..... . 
State vs. Alabama Public Service Commission (Alabama) 
307 So. 2d 521 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Straube vs. Bowlin~ Green Gas Co. (Missouri), 227 
s.w. 2d 666, 71 ............. . 
Taylor vs. Sorensen, 30 Utah 2d 275, 516 P.2d 1394 (1973). 
Utah Association of Creditmen vs. Homefire Insurance 
Company, 36 Utah 20, 102 P.361 ..... 
Utah De artment of Business Re ulation vs. Public Service 
Conu:nission, Case No. 1 l, opinion June 
Utah State Road Commission vs. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · 
TREATISES 
9 Am Jur 542, § 175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
STATUTES 
Section 54-7-17(1)(2)(3)(4) U.C.A. 1953 ...... · · · 
· Section 54-7-12 U.C.A. 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
21 
11 
24, 25 
24 
3' 10 
24 
16 
16 
11, 12 
12 
9 
11 
16 
14, 17, 
18, 19 
28 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES; 
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIA-
TION, CEDAR VALLEY PUMPERS 
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS 
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY 
PUMPERS , INC . , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD, Chair-
man; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Commis-
sioner; and DAVID R. IRVINE, 
Commissioner; and C. P. NATIONAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 16891 
This is a second appeal in a rate case filed by CP 
National Corporation (formerly California-Pacific Utilities 
Company and herein "CPN"). In 1976 the Utah Public Service 
Commission ordered CPN to increase its rates to·recover 53.03% 
of costs associated with a new transmission line constructed to 
serve its Utah electric customers. CPN and Parowan Pumpers 
Association et. al, each appealed. CPN contended that the 
Commission should have granted a rate increase to allow recovery 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of 100% of its costs. Parowan Pumpers Association argued that 
no increase should have been allowed. The Court found incon-
sistencies in the Commission's order and remanded with instructions 
to conduct further hearings, if necessary, and to harmonize its 
findings and order. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
After further hearings the Commission amended and 
supplemented the findings and conclusions of its earlier order 
leaving the ordering provisions undisturbed and denied a petition 
for customer refunds for the effective period of the order. The 
Committee of Consumer Services and certain customers appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an order directing the Commission to order 
a refund. CPN asked the Court to affirm the Connnission's 
order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 8, 1977 the Utah Public Service Commission 
issued a "Final Report and Order" (hereinafter the "February 18, 
Order") on the application of CPN for authority to pass along 
to its electric customers in Iron and Washington Counties 
costs charged to CPN by Utah Power & Light Company for construction 
of an electric transmission line. The Commission allowed re-
covery of 53.03% of such costs and ordered a rate increase 
-2-
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accordingly. Neither the utility nor the protestants were 
satisfied and both petitioned the Commission for rehearing. 
Each petition was denied by the Commission. Each petitioner 
thereafter sought review by the Court. The February 18 Order 
of the Commission was reviewed by the Court. On October 5, 1978 
the Court reversed and remanded to the Commission and instructed 
it to "take such action, including further hearings, if necessary, 
as it deems advisable for the purpose of achieving a harmonious 
relationship between its findings and order." Parowan Pumpers 
Association v. Public Service Commission 586 P.2d 407, 409. 
After the Supreme Court's decision the Commission 
consolidated a related case then pending before it, and on 
February 9, 1978 conducted a prehearing conference on the 
consolidated cases. The conference resulted in a Pre-hearing 
Order and Notice of Hearing dated November 30, 1978. As related 
to the present appeal the Commission framed the issues as follows: 
"(a) Does the decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Case 76-023-04 and the remand pursuant to 
that decision require or allow modification of the 
Commission's Final Report and Order in that Case 
without necessity for further evidentiary hearings? 
If so, what modification, if any, should the 
Commission make with respect to the said Final 
Report and Order?" (R4-6) 
On December 4, 1978 the Commission heard oral argu-
ments on the foregoing issue after which the parties filed 
written memoranda in support of their respective positions. 
The Committee of Consumer Services (herein "CCS") filed a 
petition for refund by which it asked the Commission to order 
-3-
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CPN to refund revenue collected as a result of the revenue in-
crease authorized by the February 18 Order. 
On March 24, 1979, the Commission issued an order 
directing further consolidation of a third related case. At 
the same time the Commission reopened the record in Case No. 
76-023-04 and directed that a further prehearing conference 
be held on April 23, 1979 (R24-25). 
All parties appeared at the Pre-hearing Conferences 
on April 23, 1979. The Commission issued a Pre-hearing Order 
on April 25, 1979. As related to this appeal, the Pre-hearing 
Order stated that the issues before the Commission were: "(a) 
In what particulars should the findings, conclusions and or 
order be modified or added to in order to harmonize the findings 
and order of the Commission's Report and Order issued February 18, 
1977, [and] (b) Should CP National be ordered to refund any 
portion of the revenues collected by it under the Report and 
Order of February 18, 1977?" (R27-28) The same order framed 
other issues common to the three cases, each dealing with 
allocation of transmission expenses for rate-making purposes. 
The Commission conducted Evidentiary Hearings on the 
three consolidated cases from May 3 through May 9. The case 
was submitted on written memoranda. 
On January 11, 1980 the Commission issued a Supplemental 
Report and Order (herein the "Supplemental Order") deciding the 
issues on remand. The Supplemental Order identified and re-
conciled the inconsistencies of the February 18 Order. First 
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acknowledging that the February 18 Order was "inartfully drawn 
and was hastily issued under the pressures of a heavy case-
load of hearings and paperwork" (Rl24), the Commission made the 
following findings and conclusions which explained the rationale 
of the February 18 order: 
"5. The electric service agreement entered 
between UP&L and CPN was in fact necessary for a 
firm supply of energy and for construction of new 
transmission facilities required for service to CPN's 
customers. That agreement was in the public interest. 
Expenses for construction of the new transmission line 
were necessary and reasonable expenses for continued 
electric service to CPN's Cedar City District customers. 
At the time the new line was energized, the existing 
transmission facilities were already overloaded and 
inadequate to provide necessary transmission. Con-
tinued service required new transmission capacity. 
However, the new transmission line was used to provide 
electric service not only to CPN's retail electric 
customers but also for wheeling of energy for the 
Bureau of Reclamation under the Wheeling Agreement 
referred to in the Commission's Findings. The 
Commission allowed CPN to cover only 53.03 percent 
of the transmission line expense because that was 
the ratio of use as between the utilities' electric 
customers and the wheeling of energy for the Bureau. 
The Commission made precisely the same allocation 
of expenses in the next succeeding general rate case, 
Case No. 77-023-08, and neither the Committee of 
Consumer Services nor any protestant or other party 
appealed that decision. The increase granted by the 
February 18, 1977 Order was fully justified, and the 
rates fixed by that Order were just and reasonable 
rates." (Rl24-125) 
The Supplemental Order then directed amendment of the February 
18 Order to the extent inconsistent with the above quoted 
findings. The order amended and supplemented the findings of 
the February 18 Order, accordingly, and then provided: 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That in all respects 
not inconsistent with this Supplemental Report and 
-5-
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Order, the February 18 Order is and shall remain 
in full force and effect and particularly that the 
rates fixed by the ordering provisions thereof are 
and were just and reasonable rates for the effective 
period of the Order. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the petition for 
refund filed on behalf of the Committee of Consumer 
Services is denied." (125-126) 
CCS appeals contending that the Commission should have ordered 
a refund for the effective period of the February 18 order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS 
DE'FERMINED THAT THE RATES IN EFFECT 
DURING THE TIME PERIOD IN DISPUTE 
WERE JUST AND REASONABLE RATES. THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IT IS NOT 
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE COURT TO ORDER 
A CUSTOMER REFUND 
POINT II 
WHEN A COMMISSION ORDER IS REVERSED 
AND REMANDED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
THE COMMISSION MAY ADD TO, MODIFY 
OR COMPLETE THE FINDINGS AND/OR ORDER 
POINT III 
WHEN A RATE IS FIXED BY THE COMMISSION 
AND HAS NOT BEEN SUSPENDED DURING THE 
PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL NO REFUND CAN BE 
OBTAINED FROM THE UTILITY COMPANY 
POINT IV 
SECTION 54-7-17 UCA 1953 DOES NOT REQUIRE 
OR PERMIT A REFUND IN THIS CASE 
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POINT V 
A REFUND ORDER WOULD BE CLEARLY 
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
HEARD BY THE COMMISSION. EVEN IF 
THE COMMISSION WAS WITHOUT POWER TO 
MODIFY ITS FINDINGS IT HAS THE POWER 
IN A PASS THRU CASE TO PLACE A RATE 
INTO EFFECT FOR A PRIOR PERIOD OF 
TIME TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF UTILITY 
EXPENSES 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PUBLIC SERVIOE COMMISSION HAS DETERMINED 
THAT THE RATES IN EFFECT DURING THE TIME PERIOD 
IN DISPUTE WERE JUST AND REASONABLE RATES. THE 
COMMISSIDON'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE AND IT IS NOT THE PREROGATIVE OF THE 
COURT TO ORDER A CUSTOMER REFUND. 
The Cormnission's first order became effective February 
18, 1977. Rates fixed by that order were superceded by an order 
in a subsequent rate case which became effective May 23, 1978. 
The record in the first case consisted of hundreds of pages of 
testimony dealing with the issue of allocation of transmission 
expenses for rate-making purposes. On remand the Cormnission re-
opened the hearings and took additional testimony in May 1979. 
Testimony offered during the course of this hearing consumed 
more thcµi 500 pages of testimony (see Transcript beginning at 
Rl02). After hearing all of the evidence the Public Service 
Cormnission made the following findings: 
"The increase granted by the February 18 Order was 
fully justified, and the rates fixed by that order 
were just and reasonable rates." (Rl25) 
Based upon this and other findings the order from which this appeal 
is taken provided: 
"It is further ordered that the ~petition for refund 
filed on behalf of the Cormnittee of Consumer Services 
is denied." (Rl26) 
Appellants have failed to state in their brief any basis in fact 
for a finding that the rates placed in effect by the February 18 
Order were not just and reasonable rates. Appellants make no 
argument that the Commission's finding is not supported by the 
-8-
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evidence. 
The sole remedy sought by Appellants on this appeal is 
an order directing the Commission to order a customer refund 
for the effective period of the Commission's February 18 Order. 
It has long been recognized in this state that the rate-making 
function is a legislative function over which the Commission 
has exclusive jurisdiction. In a very recent decision the 
Utah Supreme Court considered the very issue which is presented 
by the Appellants ;in this case. In Utah Department of Business 
Regulation vs. Public Service Commission, Case No. 16241, 
opinion filed June 19, 1980, the majority opinion of the Court 
made it clear thatit is not the prerogative of the courts to 
direct the Public Service Commission to order customer refunds. 
In that case the Appellant contended that the court should 
order all amounts collected under a certain rate order refunded 
to the consumers. Although reversing the order which established 
the rate, the court declined to order refunds and made it clear 
that it is the sole prerogative of the Commission to determine 
just and reasonable rates. The following quotation from the 
court's opinion shows the rationale for this conclusion: 
"The division further urges this Court to declare 
the order of the P.S.C. invalid and void f.rom its in-
ce tion, and to order the amounts collected thereunder 
to e re unde . To un erta e sue a course wou e 
tantamount to this Court engaging in rate-making, which 
is strict! a le islative ower, for the P.S.C. in 
ixing an promu gating rates acts mere y as an arm 
of the legislature. The review by this Court of the 
orders of the P.S.C. is confined to the legal issues 
of whether there is substantial evidence to sustain 
the findings of the P.S.C.; whether the P.S.C. has 
-9-
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exercised its authority according to law; and whether 
any constitutional rig~ts of the compla~ning party 
have been invaded or disregarded. Any interference 
by this Court beyond the afo:ementioned lim~ts would 
constitute an interference with the law making power 
of this state." (Pages 11-12) .[Emphasis added] 
In this case the Commission after extensive hearings has deter-
mined that the rates in effect were just and reasonable rates 
and there has been no challenge to these findings on this 
record. The court is without power to order refunds. 
follows: 
POINT II 
WHEN A COMMISSION ORDER IS REVERSED AND REMANDED 
BY THE SUPREME COURT THE COMMISSION MAY ADD TO, 
MODIFY OR COMPLETE THE FINDINGS At~D/OR ORDER. 
The Supreme Court's remand directed the Commission as 
"As we are unable to correlate the findings with 
the Commission's Order we reverse and remand the 
case to the Commission to take such action, including 
further hearings, if necessary, as it deems advisable 
for the purpose of achieving a harmonious relationship 
between its findings and order." Parowan Pumpers Asso-
ciation v. Public Service Commission 586 P.2d 407, 409. 
The Court's remand anticipated amendment of the findings and/ 
or order to achieve "a harmonious relationship" between the two. 
The Rules of Civil Procedures (adopted by the Commission as part 
of its Rules of Practice) expressly contemplate the possibility 
of modification or addition to the findings on remand. 
Rule 76, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, provides: 
"The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm, or 
modify any order or judgment appealed from, and may, 
in case the f indin s in an case are incom lete in 
any respect, or er the Court rom which the appea 
-10-
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was taken to add to, modif · or com lete the findin s 
so as to ma e the same con orm to issues presented in 
the facts as the same may be found to be the trial 
court from the evidence, and may direct the trial 
court enter "ud ent in accordance with the findin s 
w en correcte as a oresai , or may irect a new 
trial in any case or further proceedings to be had." 
[emphasis added] (Commission's Rules of Practice and 
Procedures, Rule 21.6) 
The final sentence of the decision of the Supreme Court 
obviously intended to direct the Commission to make such change 
in the findings and/or order as would be necessary to achieve 
the "harmonious" relationship between the two. In doing so, 
the Court anticipated that the Commission could add to, modify 
or complete the findings and/or the order. The court did,not 
direct that the order of the Gommission be vacated. Cases 
decided under Rules 76A, URCP demonstrate a number of the options 
available to the Court on the first appeal. The Court could 
have affirmed the Commission's findings and order. Del Porto 
v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972); Doe vs. Doe 
48 Utah 200, 158 P.781. It could have reversed and remanded 
without provisions for further hearings. Openshaw v. Young 
107 Utah 399, 152 P.2d 84 (1944); Dunn vs. Wallingford, 47 Utah 
491, 155 P.347. It could have reversed and remanded with 
specific directions. In particular, it could have required the 
Commission to conform the order to its findings. See, Utah 
State Road Commission vs. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975); 
Hargrave vs. Leigh 73 Utah 178, 273 P.298. It could have 
reversed and ordered a new hearing. Taylor v. Sorenson 30 Utah 
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2d 275, 516 P.2d 1394 (1973); Greenhalgh vs. United Tintic Mines 
Company, 42 Utah 524, 132 P.390. Finally, the Supreme Court 
could have reversed and remanded with specific instructions to 
the Commission that it was to vacate either its findings and/or 
order and make findings of fact on all issues tendered by the 
petitioners. Barnes v. Kesler & Sons Const. Co., 549 P.2d 411; 
Utah Association of Creditmen vs. Homefire Insurance Company, 
36 Utah 20, 102 P.631. 
The Court in the Parowan Pumpers decision directed 
the Commission to harmonize the findings and order. This could 
be accomplished by amendment of either the findings or the order. 
The Commission's Supplemental Report and Order shows the 
Commission's rationale for the February 18 Order and reaffirms 
that rationale based on further evidence. It acknowledges the 
undisput~_d fact that new transmission was essential to continued 
service and explains why a portion of the expense for new trans-
mission was disallowed. Conversely the order shows the factual 
basis for allowing recovery of a portion of the expense and the 
rationale for the allocation of the expense. Its findings with 
respect to the necessity for new transmission is not only con-
sistent with but required by the evidence offered at the first 
hearing, which was unchanged by the later hearings. If anything, 
the formula for allocating the recovery of the expense disfavored 
the utility. 
The evidence before the Commission indicated that the 
utility had incurred an annual expense in excess of $800,000 for 
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the construction of a new transmission line which was essential 
to continued electric service to its customers. The new line 
was energized in August of 1976 and the utility cormnenced to 
incur and actually paid monthly expenses for the new line from 
and after that date. The Commission's order was not issued 
until approximately 6 1/2 months later, February 18, 1977. During 
this per~od of time the company received no reimbursement whatever 
for the expense. The Cormnission's order of February 18 allowed 
only 53.03% of the expense. From August 1976 to the present time 
the company had paid the entire transmission line expense to 
Utah Power & Light but has been able to recover only 53% of that 
expense from and after February 18, 1977. During the effective 
period of the order (February 18, 1977 to May 23, 1978), the 
company's overall rate of return on its investment was in the 
range of 4%. 
The Findings of the February 18 Order as supplemented 
by those of the Supplemental Order are in complete harmony with 
the ordering provisions of the February 18 Order and these 
Findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
POINT III 
WHEN A RATE IS FIXED BY THE COMMISSION AND HAS 
NOT BEEN SUSPENDED DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN 
APPEAL NO REFUND CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE 
UTILITY COMPANY 
The rates approved by the Report and Order in this case 
became effective when the Connnission entered an order on February 
18, 1977. Although there is a statutory provision for suspension 
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of rates pending an appeal (Section 54-7-17, UCA 1953), no sus-
pension order was sought or entered. The rates thereafter 
charged by CPN were in accordance with the Commission's Order. 
CPN was required to charge those rates as long as the order of 
the Commission remained in effect. 
The general rule of law is that where a rate fixed by 
the Commission has not been suspended during the pendency of 
an appeal and the Commission's Order is ultimately vacated or 
set aside as unreasonable no refund can be obtained from the 
utility. Thus, even if the February 18 Order had been vacated, 
no refund may be allowed. 
In Keco Industries, Inc. v. The Cincinnati & Suburban 
Bell Tel. Co. (Ohio), 141 N.E.2d 465, telephone subscribers 
sought a refund for the difference between the original rate 
and an increased rate under a Public Utilities Connnission Order 
which was subsequently held unreasonable and unlawful. In 
denying the right to recover a refund the Supreme Court of 
Ohio said: 
(141 N.E.2d 465, 568-469) 
"In the present case we have rates which were 
established by the properly designated authority 
after a hearing and consideration in full compliance 
wi~h the law, and until such time as they· .were set 
aside by the Supreme Court, they were, in the absence 
of a stay, the lawful rates and the only ones which 
could be collected by the utility. 
"From the above consideration it is our con-
clusion that the rates of a public utility on Ohio 
are subject to a general statutory plan of regulation 
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and collection; that any rates set by the Public 
Utilities Cormnission are the lawful rates until 
such time as they are set aside as being unreasonable 
and unlawful by the Supreme Court; and that the 
General Assembly, by providing a method whereby such 
rates may be suspended until final determination as 
to their reasonableness or lawfulness by the Supreme 
Court, has completely abrogated the common-law remedy 
of restitution in such cases." 
In Mandel Brothers, Inc. vs. Chicago Tunnel Terminal 
Co. (Illinois), 117 N.E. 2d 774, the Illinois Supreme Court 
denied refunds in a similar case holding: 
(117 N.E. 2d 774, 775) 
"The fundamental issue in this case is whether 
a rate which has been approved by the Commerce Com-
mission after a hearing as to its reasonableness 
can be termed an 'excessive' rate for the purpose 
of awarding reparations. We hold that it cannot, 
even though the rate approved by the connnission has 
subsequently been set aside upon judicial review. 
"* * * 'Where the charges collected by the 
carrier were based upon rates which had theretofore 
been established or approved by the public authority, 
the fact that such rates are subsequently reduced 
afford no right of action for damages or for the 
recovery of the difference between the old and new 
rates upon the ground that the prior rate was un-
reasonable, unless such right is conferred by the 
~overning statute, as is held to be the case in some 
Jurisdictions. '" 
In Foshee vs. General Telephone Co. of the Southeast 
(Alabama), 322 So.2d 715, the Alabama Supreme Court in denying 
the right to refund held: 
(322 So.2d 715, 717) 
"Code of Ala., Tit 48, §§104, 144, establishes 
That there can be but one lawful rate. Moreover 
under these statutes a regulated public utility 
can charge only the rate established by the APSC. 
Until the APSC on remand modified their rate schedule 
pursuant to order of the circuit court, General 
Telephone could charge and collect no other rate 
except that established by the APSC in its order of 
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30 October 1972. Hence it is clear that General 
Telephone is under no legal or equitable obligation 
to refund any money to their subscribers since it 
did only what it was required to do by statute." 
See also State vs. Alabama Public Service Connnission (Alabama) 
307 So.2d521, where the Court holds that no refund can be made 
unless the rate is suspended and explains the rationale for 
the rule. 
A similar situation was presented in Straube vs. Bowling 
Green Gas Co. (Missouri), 227 S.W.2d 666, where customers of a 
gas company sought to recover a refund which had been made to the 
gas company by its gas supplier. The gas rates of the utility 
were reduced in consequence of a reduction in purchased gas 
expense but the customers sought recovery from the utility for 
a prior period covered by the gas expense refund. In denying 
recovery, the Missouri Supreme Court said: 
( 2 2 7 s . w. 2 d 6 66' 6 71) 
"When the established rate of a utility has been 
followed, the amount so collected becomes the property 
of the utility of which it cannot be deprived by either 
legislative or judicial action without violating the 
due process provisions of the State and Federal 
Constitutions." 
The general rule is SUIIDllarized in 9 Am Jur 542, § 175: 
"Where the charges collected by the carrier 
were based upon rates which had theretofore been 
established or approved by the public authority, 
the fact that such rates are subsequently reduced 
afford no right of action for damages or for the 
recovery of the difference between the old and new 
rates upon the ground that the prior rate was un-
reasonable, unless such right is conferred by the 
governing statute, as is held to be the case in some jurisdictions." 
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The Utah statutes are substantially the same as those 
construed in the cases above-cited. Under Section 54-7-17, U.C.A., 
1953, the pendency of the appeal does not stay the order, but any 
party may apply to the Court for a suspension Order suspending 
the rates under the Connnission's Report and Order during the 
pendency of the appeal. This was not done. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 54-7-17 UCA 1953 DOES NOT REQUIRE OR 
PERMIT A REFUND IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant argues that 54-7-17 (4) provides a mechanism 
for an automatic refund. From this discordant premise Appellant 
seeks to have the Supreme Court reverse the Connnission and 
order a refund. This interpretation misreads section 54-7-17. 
This section of the code is divided into four subsections. 
54-7-17(1) reads: 
"The pendency of a writ of review shall not 
of itself stay or suspend the operation of the 
order or decision of the connnission, but during 
the pendency of such writ the Supreme Court in 
its discretion may stay or suspend, in whole or 
in part, the operation of the commission's order 
or decision." 
The first subsection establishes the option for the 
Supreme Court to stay or suspend an order of the Commission 
pending an appeal. 
54-7-17(2) reads: 
"No order so staying or suspending an order or 
decision of the commission shall be made by the Supreme 
Court otherwise than upon three days' notice and 
after hearing, and if the order or decisio~ of the 
commission is suspended, the order suspending t~e same 
shall contain a specific finding, based upon evidence 
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submitted to the court and identified by reference 
thereto that great or irreparable damage would 
otherwi~e result to the petitioner, and specifying 
the nature of the damage." 
The second subsection establishes the requirement of 
a hearing with advance written notice to the parties to be held 
before any stay or suspension can be granted. 
The third subsection, §54-7-17(3), specifies that in 
the event a stay or suspension is granted a suspending bond must 
be posted and in certain circumstances the utility is required to 
deposit revenues with the court to insure the availability of 
reftmd monies if the order on appeal is reversed. 
54-7-17(4) provides: 
"In case the Supreme Court stays or suspends 
any order or decision lowering any rate, fare, toll, 
rental, charge or classification, the cormnission 
upon the execution and approval of such suspending 
bond shall forthwith require the public utility 
affected, under penalty of the immediate enforcement 
of the order or decision of the cormnission pending 
the review and notwithstanding the suspending order, 
to keep such accounts, verified by oath, as may 
in the judgment of the commission suffice to show the 
amounts being charged or received by such public 
utility pending the review in excess of the charges 
allowed by the order or decision of the commission, 
together with the names and address of the persons 
to whom overcharges will be refundable, in case the 
charges made by the public utility pending the review 
are not s.us.tai11ed 1by the Supreme Court. The court 
may from time to time require such party petitioning 
for a review to give additional security or to increase 
the said suspending bond whenever in the opinion of 
the court the same may be necessary to ensure the 
prompt payment of such damages and such overcharges. 
Upon the final decision by the Supreme Court all 
moneys which the public utility may have collected 
pending the appeal in excess of those authorized by 
such final decision, together with interest in case 
the court ordered the deposit of such moneys in a 
bank or trust company, shall be promptly paid to 
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the persons entitled thereto in such manner and 
through such methods of distribution as may be pre-
scribed by the cormnission. If any such moneys 
shall not have been claimed by the persons entitled 
thereto within one year from the final decision of 
the Supreme Court, the commission shall cause notice 
to such persons to be given by publication, once 
a week for two successive weeks, in a newspaper of 
general circulation printed and published in the city 
and county of Salt Lake, and in such other newspaper 
or newspapers as may be designated by the commission; 
said notice to state the names of the persons entitled 
to such moneys and the amount due each person. All 
moneys not claimed within three months after the 
publication of such notice shall be paid by the 
public utility under the direction of the cormnission 
into the state treasury for the benefit of the general 
fund.'' 
The fourth subsection establishes an accounting procedure to 
insure the proper distribution of a refund after final decision 
of the Court. 
Appellants cite section 54-7-17(4) and argue that this 
subsection is "directly applicable to this case." Subsection (4) 
by its own language applies "In case the Supreme Court stays or 
suspends any order or decision lowering any rates ... "and 
provides in such cases that "all monies which the public utility 
may have collected pending the appeal in excess of those 
authorized by such final decision ... shall be [refunded]". 
It should be noticed that this subsection applies only to cases 
where the rates are suspended and where the orQer lowers the 
preexisting rates. This section supports the position of the 
Respondents in this case because it requires, as a condition 
to the refund, that the Connnission's order be suspended by the 
Court. That was not done. 
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The Appellants rely on The Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph vs. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 520, 155 
P.2d 184. That case is not supportive of Appellant's position 
because in that case the parties preserved the right to the 
reftmd by following the provisions of Section 54-7-17(4). The 
court issued an order suspending the rates. If applicable to this 
at all, the opinion in that case supports the Respondents position 
in this case that no refund is appropriate where the rates remain 
in effect without suspension or stay. 
Appellant relies heavily upon the case of the City of 
Los Angeles vs. The Public Service Commission (California 497 
P.2d 786). That case is easily distinguishable. The California 
Court had issued a stay directing that all sums collected by 
the utility pursuant to the rates authorized by the Commission 
should be subject to refund upon order of the Court should the 
Commission's decision be annulled or modified. The Commission's 
decision was set aside and the Court ordered the utility to make 
refunds. 
CCS also relies upon the case of The Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegrar.hCo. vs. Public Service Commission (Colorado) 
502 P.2d 945. In that case the Colorado Court acknowledged case 
law supporting the rule that a rate is not subject to refund 
if it is approved by a regulatory commission and collected 
without suspension or bond. The Court recognized the validity 
of the general proposition that when a regulatory commission 
fixes rates for the future in one proceedings, it cannot, in 
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a subsequent proceeding, decide that the previously approved 
rates were unreasonable and thereupon establish lower rates 
with retroactive effect. In distinguishing these cases the 
Colorado Supreme Court said: 
(502 P.2d 945, 949) 
"This rule is not applicalbe to the facts before 
us. This Court, on appeal, not the Commission in a 
subsequent proceeding, decided that a portion of the 
1969 Rate Order was in error. This Court, not the 
Connnission, found that benefits resulting from the 
correction of those errors should be aassed on to 
Motmtain Bell customers. [emphasis a ded] 
"This Court may, on review of a Cormnission Rate 
Order, require correction of legal errors contained 
in the Order and provide that benefits arising from 
those corrections be passed on to the consumers of 
the utility." [emphasis added] 
The exception carved out by the Colorado Supreme Court applies 
where the Court (not the Cormnission) orders refunds "passed on 
to the consumers of the utility". In each case cited by CCS 
the Court (not the regulatory connnission) has undertaken to order 
the refund (see City of Los Angeles vs. Public Utility Commission 
et al., (California), 497 P.2d 785; Mountain States Telephone 
& Telegraph Co. vs. Public Utility Connnission, supra; California 
Municipal League vs. Public Utility Commission (California), 
473 P.2d 960). In each of those cases the Court actually deter-
mined that the Commission had erred in its determination of test-
year expenses and/or rate base and that the ultimate findings 
were therefore unsupported by the evidence. In all but the 
Colorado case the rates had been suspended during the appeal 
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proceedings. This is not the case with the Supreme Court's 
decision before this Commission. The Court made no determination 
with respect to the evidence. The case was remanded solely 
because of the inconsistency between the Findings and the Order 
with directions to "harmonize" the two. More important, the 
Court in this case has not vacated the rate order and has not 
directed that the utility make refunds to its customers, and 
there is no argument or evidence that the Conmiission erred in 
making any of the findings made by it or that such findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence. 
In summary, neither Section 54-7-17, U.C.A. 1953 nor 
cases cited by the Appellants are applicable to this case. 
Numerous decisions from many separate jurisdictions support the 
rule that refunds may not be required where the rates are fixed 
by the Commission and remain in effect without suspension 
during the pendency of the appeal period (see Point III). 
POINT V 
A REFUND ORDER WOULD BE CLEARLY AGAINST 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE HEARD BY THE 
COMMISSION. EVEN IF THE COMMISSION WAS 
WITHOUT POWER TO MODIFY ITS FINDINGS IT 
HAS THE POWER IN A PASS THRU CASE TO 
PLACE A RATE INTO EFFECT FOR A PRIOR 
PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF 
UTILITY EXPENSES. . 
The Commission did not act in ignorance. There was 
a rationale for both the original order and the Supplemental 
Report and Order. Although we do not concur with the rationale 
which does not allow recovery of all of the transmission line 
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expense we do understand the Commission's reasoning in allowing 
only 53.03% of such expense. The allocation of transmission line 
expense was based upon actual usage of the transmission line as 
between the jurisdictional rate-payers and the Bureau of Reclama-
tion. The evidence on which the allocation was made is not in 
dispute. If the allocation was unjust, it favored the customers 
because it placed the burden for almost 50% of a utility expense 
upon the shareholders of the utility with no means to recover 
that expense. 
But even if the February 18 Order were vacated there should 
be no refund of revenues paid during the effective period of that 
Order. As previously observed, the general rule of law is that 
where a rate fixed by the Commission has not been suspended during 
the pendency of an appeal and the Commission's Order is ultimately 
vacated or set aside as unreasonable, no refunds can be obtained 
from the utility. (See Point III) 
Appellants take the position that the Commission's 
February 18 Order was a nullity, and that the only lawful rates 
in effect during the period in question were those in existence 
prior to the Commission's Order. Appellants' position is based 
upon the decision of the California Supreme Court in the 1972 
case of City of Los Angeles, et al. vs. Public Utility Commission, 
et al, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 497 P.2d 785. In that case the 
California Supreme Court said that: 
"When the rates set in the decision before us 
are annulled, the only lawful rates are th~s: which 
were in existence prior to the instant decision. We 
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are satisfied that to permit the commission to fix 
new rates for the purpose of refunds, as requested 
by Pacific would involve retroactive rate making in 
violation ~f the principles recognized in Pacific 
Tel. & Tel. Co., v. Public Util. Comm. supra, 62 
Cal.Zd 634, 649-656, 44 Cal. Rptr. l, 401 P.2d 353." 
As we have already pointed out, the 1972 Los Angeles 
case is clearly distinguishable because in that case the rate 
was suspended during the pendency of the appeal and revenues 
were collected subject to refund. Furthermore, in the Los 
Angeles case, unlike the case now before the Court, the reviewing 
Court actually vacated the Commission's Order. The Utah Supreme 
Court did not vacate but instead remanded to achieve harmony 
between the Findings and Order. There is another reason, however, 
why the Los Angeles case has no application to the case now 
before the Commission. 
The Los Angeles case was a general rate case. In 
more recent decisions the California Supreme Court has held that 
the rule stated in that case and in the earlier case of Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission, (CalifornL 
1965) 401 P.2d 355, (also cited by Appellant) applies only to 
general rate cases and has no application to "off-set" or "pass-
thru" rate cases which do not involve the general rate making 
process. In Southern California Edison Company vs. Public 
Utility Commission, 144 Cal. Rptr. 905. 576 P.2d (1978) the Court 
permitted retroactive adjustment of rates in a pass-through rate 
case on the rationale that the cost adjustment did not constitute 
"rate mak1" ng". Ref · t th L An 1 d P · f · erring o e os ge es an aci 1c cases, 
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the California Court distinguished them as follows: 
(576 P.2d 945) 
"We question neither the rule stated in the 
foregoing decisions nor its application to the facts 
there presented. But this is not such a case. At 
the risk of belaboring the obvious, we observe that 
before there can be retroactive rate-making there 
must at least be ratemaking. There undoubtedly was 
ratemaking in both Pacific Te. & Tel. and City of 
Los Angeles I; as we shall explain, however, rate-
making within the meaning of the cited decisions 
did not occur in the case at bar." 
In a footnote to its decision the Court distinguished the 
Pacific case: 
(Footnote 3, 576 P.2d 946) 
"Pacific Tel. & Tel. relied on a number of 
decisions of federal courts and our sister states 
which likewise held that rate-fixing orders could 
operate only prospectively. (62 Cal.2d at pp. 650-
652, 44 Cal. Rpts. 1, 401 P.2d 353.) But an examina-
tion of each shows that all involved various types 
of general rate orders and none remotely resembled 
the situation now before us." 
Thus, the most recent decisions of the California Supreme Court 
have limited the rule prohibiting retroactive rate making to a 
general rate case and have determined that the rule has no 
application to the abbreviated "offset" or "pass-thru" proceedings. 
Indeed the court has approved retroactive adjustment of rates 
in pass-thru cases. The distinction between the "general" and 
"pass-thru" cases is described in California Manufacturers 
Association v. Public Utility Connnission, Southern California 
Gas Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, California 
(1979) 595 P.2d 98. In that case the California Supreme Court 
said: 
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"In a general rate s~tting proceeding, the 
Commission determines for a test period the utility's 
expense, the utility's rate base and the rate of 
return to be allowed. Using those figures the 
Commission determines the revenue requirement, and 
then fixes the rates for the consumers to produce 
sufficient income to meet the revenue requirements ... 
The rates are fixed in the general proceedings on the 
basis of historical data. Adjustments may be made 
in that proceeding for anticipated future extra-
ordinary changes .... It is obvious, revenues, expense, 
and rate base arrived at on historical data will not 
remain constant in future years when the rates take 
effect. The assumption underlying fixing of future 
rates on historical data is that for future years 
changes in the revenues, expense and rate base will 
vary proportionately so that the utility will receive 
a fair.rate of return. 595 P.2d 98, 100. 
"When an item of either expense or revenue tends 
to vary abnormally in comparison to the utility's 
other financial criteria, adjustment of rates charged 
have been permitted in abbreviated proceedings .... 
Such proceedings--termed off-set proceedinp,s by the 
parties--have been used in the past to make rate 
adjustments necessitated by increases in fuel costs 
disproportionate to the variations in other costs." 
595 P.2d 98, 101. 
The California Manufacturers case involved an offset or pass-
thru type proceedings to recover increased fuel costs. In 
holding that rule against retroactive rate making has no effect 
in such a case, the Court said: 
"The utilities' briefs were filed prior to 
the recent decision in Southern California Edison Co. 
vs. Public Utility Connnission, supra, 20 Cal. 3d 813. 
In that case the Court held that rate changes based on 
increased fuel costs do not involve rate making and 
that therefore the rule against retroactive rate making 
was not applicable ... " 595 P.2d 98, 103. 
The case now before the court is an "offset" or "pass-
thru" type proceeding for recovery of extraordinary expense. It 
is not a general rate making proceeding. Therefore, under the 
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California Rule, the Commission had jurisdiction in this case to 
make a new determination with respect to that portion of the 
transmission line expense which should be allowed and to give 
that determination retroactive effect. In other words even 
if the February 18 Order were technically a nullity as claimed 
by Appellants (an argument Respondent does not concede), the 
Commission under the California Rule (and even if the rate had 
been susnended in this case) could have subsequently detert!lined 
that allowance of 53.03% of the expense or any other portion thereof 
was reasonable and could have then given such determination 
retroactive effect. The evidence offered during the several days 
of hearings on remand fully support such a result and Appellants 
make no argument that the Conrrnission's order is not supported 
by substantial evidence. The findings in the Supplemental Order 
expressly determine just and reasonable rates for the effective 
period of the February 18 Order. It is noteworthy that the same 
issue of transmission line expense was treated by the Commission 
in the general rate case which followed 76-023-04. In 77-023-08 
the Commission made the same ruling allowing 53.03% of the Utah 
Power & Light transmission expense. No appeal was taken from 
that case. (See Rl24-125) 
There is an additional flaw in the legalistic argument 
urged by the Appellants. Counsel for the Appellants argued 
before the Conrrnission that if the February 18 order was a nullity, 
the only lawful rate was that rate in effect prior to the filing 
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of the case. This is not true because the next preceding rate 
Order was a Tentative Order issued September 29, 1976 in Case 
No. 76-023-04 and pursuant to that Order Tariffs were filed 
and became effective September 30, 1976. That Order allowed 
recovery of more revenue than the Final Order issued February 
18, 1977. No appeal was taken from the Tentative Order. Further, 
even assuming, arguendo, that the Tentative Order was rendered 
ineffectual by a succeeding order which is a "nullity", 
Appellants have an additional obstacle in their argument that 
rates preceding the filing of the case should have prevailed. 
Under the provisions of Section 54-7-12, U.C.A., 1953, a rate 
filed by a utility becomes final at the expiration of 120 days. 
The rates in 76-023-04 were filed June 30, 1976. If the 
Commission's Order of February 18, 1977 was a nullity, as claimed 
by the Appellants, and the Order of September 29, 1976 had no 
legal effect, then the rates filed by CPN in Case No. 76-023-04 
became final by virtue of the expiration of the suspension 
period and the utility is entitled to recover the full amount 
of such rates which includes all of the expense disallowed in 
the February 18 Order. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission has determined just and reasonable 
rates for the period in dispute and that determination is supported 
by substantial evidence. The Commission has power to modify 
and add to its Findings on remand. The modifications made by 
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it are supported by reason and by the evidence and result in 
complete harmony between the Findings and the Order. No refund 
is required or should be permitted in this case. The Supple-
mental Re~ort and Order should be affirmed. 
Resµectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Grant Macfarlane, Jr. 
Patrick Shea 
Attorneys for CP National Corporation 
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